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Abstract 
 
This study evaluates the efficiency of peripheral European domestic banks and examines the effects of bank-
risk determinants on their performance over 2007-2014. Data Envelopment Analysis is utilized on a Malmquist 
Productivity Index in order to calculate the bank efficiency scores. Next, a Double Bootstrapped Truncated 
Regression is applied to obtain bias-corrected scores and examine whether changes in the financial conditions 
affect differently banks’ efficiency levels. The analysis accounts for the sovereign debt crisis period and for 
different levels of financial development in the countries under study. Such an application in the respective 
European banking setting is unique. The proposed method also copes with common misspecification problems 
observed in regression models based on efficiency scores. The results have important policy implications for 
the Euro area, as they indicate the existence of a periphery efficiency meta-frontier. Liquidity and credit risk 
are found to negatively affect banks productivity, whereas capital and profit risk have a positive impact on 
their performance. The crisis period is found to augment these effects, while bank-risk variables affect more 
banks' efficiency when lower levels of financial development are observed. 
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1. Introduction 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric linear programming technique, which extends the idea of 
estimating efficiency by comparing each Decision Making Units (DMUs) with an efficient production frontier 
(Farrell, 1957). As introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), DEA defines the set of best-practice observations for the 
DMUs under study and produces a convex production possibilities set by connecting the best-practice observations 
with a piecewise linear frontier. This principle is the basis of the traditional DEA and its applications are spread 
across different scientific disciplines (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2005; Lee, 2010; Chiang and Che, 2015; LaPlante and 
Paradi, 2015). 
The banking sector plays a crucial role in the development of any financial system. Consequently, identifying ways 
to analyse the efficiency of banks has been in the centre of policy makers’, economists’, institutions’ and 
academics’ research. For that reason, the DEA literature on banking efficiency is voluminous. Nonetheless, it is 
characterised by different methodological approaches and mixed results. Most studies traditionally focus on US 
and European markets, as illustrated by the cornerstone survey work of Berger & Humphrey (1997). The scope in 
later years shifts primarily in the European setting. For example, Altunbas et al. (2001) analyse the efficiency of 
German banks in relation with their type of ownership types and they claim that there is no significant evidence to 
suggest that privately owned banks are more efficient than their mutual and public sector counterparts. Maudos and 
Pastor (2003) control for cost and profit efficiencies for the Spanish and Italian banks respectively and they note 
that most efficient and profitable institutions are able to better control costs. Chortareas et al. (2009) examine the 
case of Greece with several metrics of banks’ efficiency and they conclude that controlling for risk preferences is 
important in determining bank efficiency.  
The above studies follow a single-country DEA approach. The rationale behind this choice is that the cross-country 
banking sector cannot be considered homogeneous due to national variations in legal tradition, regulatory 
frameworks, culture and religion (Berger, 2007). Lately, vast numbers of studies knuckle down to European 
comparative studies. This cross-country shift is driven mainly by two factors. Firstly, the introduction of the Single 
Market in the European Union over the nineties raised the expectations for higher financial integration and bank 
efficiency convergence within Europe (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007; Weill, 2009). Secondly and most importantly, 
the Global Financial and Eurozone sovereign debt crises demonstrated the need for a tighter banking sector union, 
especially in the Eurozone periphery (Casu et al., 2016).   
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One such example is the work of Casu et al. (2004) who evaluate the productivity changes in European banking 
between 1994 and 2000. Their results imply that productivity growth is brought through improvements in 
technological change, rather than technical efficiency. Altunbas et al. (2007) conclude that there is a clear 
relationship between capital, risk and efficiency, as European inefficient banks tend to hold more capital and take 
on less risk. Brissimis et al. (2008) evaluate the banking efficiency across newly acceded EU countries and they 
find that the banking sector reform and competition impact positively the bank efficiency, while capital and credit 
risk negatively effect bank performance. Finally, Casu and Girardone (2010) discuss how integration and efficiency 
convergence appears in EU banking markets. Their results indicate that there is a level of convergence towards a 
European efficiency average, but this pattern does not lead to efficiency improvements across all countries.  
Casu et al. (2016) recently evaluate the effect of the Eurozone crisis and observe a structural break in bank 
productivity growth in the Eurozone countries at the start of the crisis. This is particularly interesting, given that 
the Eurozone markets have small capital markets. In 2012, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) saw 
their stock market capitalisation to further reduce.1 During this period, banks faced liquidity shortages and higher 
credit risk, which led to cuts of their lending conditions up to 47% for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). 
Logically focusing on the periphery economies should provide further insight on what effect capital markets’ 
development has on banking efficiency. The intuition behind that is that banks and capital markets can be 
complementary to one another, as capital market development lowers the cost of bank equity capital. Consequently, 
this enables banks to raise the extra capital needed to take on riskier loans that they would otherwise reject (Vazquez 
and Federico, 2015). Other studies show that the sovereign debt crisis adversely affects the European stock markets 
and as a result, countries with poor credit market regulations and with larger pre-crisis account deficits (Giannonne 
et al., 2011 and Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012). With this in mind, the European Commission (EC) initiatives 
and vision (BASEL III and Capital Market Union (CMU)) to allow capital markets’ development and deepen the 
banking integration seem especially relevant for fostering growth in the Eurozone periphery (Durusu-Ciftci et al., 
2017).  
From a methodological point of view, DEA continues to be very popular for practitioners as a technique for 
evaluating DMUs’ efficiency (Asosheh et al., 2010). Its application is easy and interpretable, while it is able to 
                                                            
1 The corresponded figures for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain area are 21.3%, 15.4%, 28.4% and 76% respectively.  
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project an efficient frontier formed by linear combinations connecting the set of ‘best-practice’ observations in the 
dataset. A DEA practitioner does not need to make assumptions about the distribution of inefficiency, while Fethi 
and Pasiouras (2010, p.190) suggest that DEA ‘does not require a particular functional form on the data in 
determining the most efficient banks’. Compared to other parametric techniques, DEA is also able to cope with 
small sample sizes and the application of categorical variables that are commonly used in country-specific panels 
of data (Brissimis et al., 2008; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). This is particularly important for banking datasets that 
are usually small in nature. In traditional statistical approaches (e.g. regression analysis), small sample size comes 
at a cost as the average DMU behaviour is of interest. On the other hand, DEA focuses on the performance of each 
DMU. Therefore, the number of DMUs in a DEA framework could be considered immaterial (see amongst others 
and Cook et al. (2014) and Tsolas and Charles (2015)). Finally, most parametric approaches introduce time trends 
to the data which lead to smoothing out the variation of the productivity changes.  
Additionally, there is no consensus around the DEA orientation (Cook et al. 2014). Many researchers advocate the 
input-oriented approach assuming that bank managers impose control over inputs (e.g. expenses) rather than 
outputs (e.g. income) (Wu et al., 2006; Khodabakhshi et al., 2010; Tsolas and Charles, 2015). On the other hand, 
others believe it is more appropriate to answer how can output quantities be proportionally expanded without 
changing the underlying input quantities used over different time periods (see amongst others Grifell-Tatjé and 
Lovell (1997), Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) and Bassem (2014)). Although the literature is conflicting, many studies 
suggest that the choice of orientation has minimum effect upon the actual calculated scores. Therefore, the DEA 
orientation should not be a point of friction across researchers’ approaches.  
Several studies on banking efficiency proceed to a two-stage approach, where efficiency scores are estimated in 
the first stage and then simply regressed on independent environmental variables (Wang et al., 2003; Beccalli et 
al., 2006; Sun and Chang, 2011). This approach is problematic for the following reasons. Firstly, the estimated 
distances from the DEA frontier can be underestimated when optimal DMUs are excluded from the sample (sample 
bias). Secondly, traditionally DEA estimates (not incorporating Malmquist index approaches) introduce boundary 
inefficiencies in the OLS method. Finally, efficiency scores suffer from high serial correlation, which impedes their 
statistical interpretability and valid estimation. All these disadvantages are clearly explained by the influential work 
of Simar and Wilson (2007). The authors introduce a Double-Bootstrapped Truncated Regression (DBTR) 
framework, which copes with the above issues and provides bias-corrected efficiency scores. The benefits of this 
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approach are well-documented in the respective banking literature (see amongst others Feng and Serletis (2010), 
Assaf et al. (2011), Chortareas et al. (2013), Wanke and Barros (2014), Wanke et al. (2016)). 
The above background positions this work clearly in the respective literature and clarify its motivation. Firstly, 
DEA efficiency scores based on a Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) are calculated on a cross-country level, 
namely the peripheral economies of GIIPS. This approach, although not the only available for efficiency scores’ 
calculation, is common in the respective literature (see amongst others Färe et al. (1994), Casu et al. (2004), 
Tortosa-Ausina et al., (2008) and Kevork et al. (2017)). In our case, efficiency is evaluated based on the five metrics 
derived from the ‘enhanced decomposition’ proposed by Färe et al. (1994).  Secondly, a DBTR framework is 
adopted in order to reconstruct the initial DEA estimates into bias-corrected ones which are optimized for the 
second-stage regression.  
This study is offering several innovations in terms of the methodological approach undertaken. We further validate 
the success of the MPI’s ‘enhanced decomposition’ and Simar’s and Wilson’s (2007) approach. In particular, we 
provide a unique setting to calculate different bank efficiency metrics and evaluate the effects of bank-risk variables 
and financial development on them through regression specifications. These are based on the second algorithm 
proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).  The selection of this algorithm is crucial, as in two-stage DEA regressions 
the covariates in the second-step can be highly correlated with the covariates in the first-step. This would clearly 
offer a rejection of the initial assumption of independence between them and the errors (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010).  
Applying these regressions allow us to assess in a robust econometric way, whether changes in the financial 
conditions of peripheral European banks in and out-of-the crisis affect differently their efficiency, taking into 
account the level of financial development in the respective countries. Specifically, we are interested in identifying 
which (if any) bank-level risk characteristics are important factors in shaping banks’ operations. In order to achieve 
that, we construct a balanced panel over the period of 2007-2014 with variables that traditionally are considered 
determinants of banks’ behaviour. We find that higher levels of liquidity risk and credit risk exert a negative effect 
on banks’ efficiency levels, whereas capital risk and profit risk have a positive one. Additionally, bank risk variables 
have a more negative impact during the crisis than outside of the crisis period. Finally, when we consider the 
indirect role of financial development, it is clear that bank-risk variables exert a higher impact on banks’ efficiency 
for lower levels of financial development during the crisis. These are important and innovative results, when 
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discussing banking efficiency in the GIIPS and integration of their financial institutions in the European single 
market. 
This study also claims that the MPI efficiency metrics can be considered as early warning indicators of financial 
instability and potentially used as macroeconomic tools to evaluate the financial system and its capital development. 
This is a novel notion in the respective literature, which is supported the evidence of a domestic bank efficiency 
meta-frontier within the peripheral economies that this study brings forward. A meta-frontier in a DEA framework 
is an efficiency frontier that covers the performance of all DMUs operating in different regions under different 
technologies. Although the methodological scope of this study is not to perform meta-frontier analysis per se, the 
identification of similar performances of banks across different countries is very important for practitioners and policy 
makers that are interested to further investigate this issue within the European banking environment (Bos and Schmiedel, 
2007).  
Overall, the contribution of this study to the relevant banking literature is multi-fold. Firstly, the empirical evidence 
provides a precise and econometrically robust DEA analysis for the Eurozone periphery, extending the previously 
mentioned trend to cross-country comparative studies. Casu et al. (2016) present a relevant analysis, but the authors 
do not apply the principles of the truncated regression and exclude Ireland from their analysis. As such, a full 
picture on the peripheral economy is not provided and at the same time their DEA results might be biased, especially 
during the calculation of the meta-frontier. Secondly, to the best of our knowledge there is no other paper 
connecting the effects of financial development on the Eurozone’s periphery banks. Thirdly, very little research is 
available on the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on banks’ activities. This is confirmed by Lenarčič et al. (2016), 
who clearly state that the effects of sovereign risk to bank balance sheets remain unexplored, despite the extensive 
reforms in bank regulation over the last years. This work goes towards bridging this clear gap in the literature. 
Finally, the following studies seem relevant to the context under study. Popov and Van Horen (2013) identify a 
direct link between deterioration in a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio and bank lending in the loan market. Bedendo 
and Colla, (2015) explore the relation between a country’s sovereign debt quality and the credit risk of domestic 
non-financial firms. Recently, Ferrando et al. (2015) explore the effect of the sovereign debt crisis on SMEs access 
to banks finance. However, none of the three clearly focuses on the role of the sovereign debt crisis on banks 
productivity.  
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the two-stage methodology adopted in this 
study, namely the DEA-MPI and the DBTR, while section 3 presents the respective dataset. Section 4 summarizes 
all the empirical results obtained. Finally, section 5 provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Methodology 
This section describes the methodological approach undertaken in order to obtain unbiased bank efficiency scores 
and evaluate the effects of bank-specific variables on them. Initially, we motivate the selected variables and the 
orientation of our model. Then, the DEA based on Malmquist Productivity Index (DEA-MPI) is presented. Finally, 
the Double-Bootstrapped Truncated Regression (DBTR) is explained along with the selected regression 
specifications. 
 
2.1 Variables and orientation selection  
Another issue that needs to be clarified before implementing DEA is the balance of the number of inputs and 
outputs. Although Cook et al. (2014) suggest that the number of evaluated DMUs may be immaterial in cases, a 
parsimonious solution can be reached only by restricting the input-output set. For that reason, we follow the well-
accepted ‘rule of thumb’ proposed by Cooper et al. (2007), based on which the number of DMUs must be higher 
than three times the sum of inputs and outputs. The authors claim that if this rule does not hold, then large number 
of DMUs might be found efficient. However, the lack of degrees of freedom is likely to make the efficiency 
discrimination questionable. For that reason, in our case two inputs and one output are selected to measure 
productivity change.  
The nature of these three variables falls within the debate of DEA vector selection. This debate is not only 
econometrical (number of inputs and outputs), but it is also theoretical within a banking context. Early studies 
address banking efficiency through the intermediation and production approaches. Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
claim, though, that neither of the two methods captures appropriately the role of banks as financial intermediaries 
and transaction processing services’ suppliers. For that reason, in this study the profit-based DEA is applied, which 
uses revenues as outputs and costs as inputs. This allow us to form a technology set based on spending and earnings 
of the observed DMUs. Such an approach is more meaningful for a bank, when its underlying behavioural objective 
is the profit maximization (Sahoo et al., 2014). Profit-based input/output selection can lead to efficiency scores 
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capturing better the decision-making diversity across financial institutions, when those are responding to their 
competitive environment (see amongst others Maudos et al. (2002), Drake et al., (2006) and Sahoo et al., (2014)). 
The traditional economic factors driving productivity are land, labour and capital. Operating expenses can be 
thought as a proxy for land, labour wages, physical capital expenses and provisions for doubtful loans. Interest 
expenses can also be a proxy for the capital provided by the banks’ stakeholders or by its depositors. For that 
reason, they are both selected as inputs for our analysis. The output variable is the total income calculated as the 
sum of interest and non-interest income2.  
Finally, as mentioned earlier, there is no consensus regarding the DEA orientation selection (Cook et al., 2014). 
Nonetheless, every practitioner needs to make a ‘judgement call’ when it comes to implementing DEA. In our case, 
we implement an output-oriented DEA. In that scenario, the efficiency scores show the possible proportional 
increases in the output levels, while the inputs proportions remain unchanged. Following studies related to the 
‘social control’ of banks (Ataullah et al., 2004), we postulate that banking is output-oriented in nature, as bank 
managers are expected to have more flexibility with the bank’s outputs rather than its inputs, especially in countries 
with tightening financial and economic environment (Casu et al., 2004; Ataullah and Le,2006; LaPlante and Paradi, 
2015). 
 
2.2 First stage: DEA-MPI 
The first stage of this study utilizes a DEA approach based on the MPI to investigate how productivity of each bank 
changes through time.  This is done by following an output-oriented DEA approach described by Färe et al., (1994).  
Let 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑦𝑡 ∈  𝑅+
𝑀 the selected input and output variables (for N*1 input and M*1 output vectors) and n 
the total number of banks, then the production set3 𝑃𝑡 in time 𝑡 can be expressed as: 
         𝑃𝑡 = {(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡): 𝑥𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦𝑡}                                           (1) 
The production frontier with the output-oriented distance function under the assumption of Constant Returns to 
Scale (CRS) can be defined as: 
                                                            
2 Interest expense is more accurate than the total amount of deposits as not all deposits carry the same interest expense. DEA is not 
efficient in dealing with negative values. Hence, results for the banks whose non-interest income is negative will be questionable 
Therefore, the total income approach is preferred as the output vector. 
3 The production set is also commonly referred to as production frontier/technology (see amongst others Färe et al., (1994) and 
Simar and Wilson (2007)).    
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𝐷0
𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡) = min {𝜑 | (𝑥𝑗
𝑡, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡/𝜑)  ∈  𝑃𝑡}, 𝑗 = 1,2 … 𝑛                             (2) 
In equation (2), the ‘0’ subscript denotes the output orientation of the model. The distance aims to identify the 
reciprocal of the greatest proportional increase in output, given the input but also keeping the output feasible. In 
other words, it defines the technology of bank 𝑗 at time 𝑡 relative to the output technical efficiency at time 𝑡 (Färe 
et al., 1994). Here, the technical efficiency is estimated relative to the contemporaneous technology as 
 𝐷0
𝑡(𝑋𝑗
𝑡, 𝑌𝑗
𝑡) ≤ 1. Only when the unit 𝑗 is on the production frontier (i.e. technically efficient), can the equation be 
expressed in the form  𝐷0
𝑡(𝑋𝑗
𝑡, 𝑌𝑗
𝑡) = 1. Alternatively, 𝐷0
𝑡(𝑋𝑗
𝑡 , 𝑌𝑗
𝑡) < 1 means that the unit below the frontier is 
technically inefficient. To define the MPI, a specification of distance functions with respect to two different time 
periods is needed. At time 𝑡, the efficiency of unit 𝑗 relative to the technology at time 𝑡 + 1 is expressed by: 
            𝐷0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1) = min {𝜑| (𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1/𝜑)  ∈  𝑃𝑡}, }, 𝑗 = 1,2 … 𝑛     (3) 
This distance measures the maximum proportional change in outputs required to make (𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1) feasible in 
relation to technology at time t. Distance functions are computed by employing a DEA linear programming 
methodology. The CRS output-oriented DEA problem is defined as below:   
                        𝐷0
𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
−1
= max 𝜑𝑗  𝑠. 𝑡.  {−𝜑𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡  𝜆 ≥ 0,  𝑥𝑗
𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡𝜆 ≥ 0, 𝜆 ≥ 0}               (4) 
Where 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 represent the vector of outputs and inputs respectively and 𝜆 signifies the weight vector (a weight 
is assigned to each unit within the reference ‘peer’ group, which is compared to any particular observation in order 
to determine the distance to the efficient frontier). Caves et al. (1982) defined MPI (M) at two consecutive time 
periods (t, s) as: 
{
𝑀𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1 , 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑗
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑗
𝑡) = 𝐷0
𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)/𝐷0
𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
𝑀𝑡+1(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1 , 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑗
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑗
𝑡) = 𝐷0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)/𝐷0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑗
𝑡, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
                (5) 
To avoid the use of an arbitrary benchmark, the two continuous MPIs are combined into one by estimating its 
geometric mean, which provides the calculation of the Total Factor Productivity Change (TFPCH):  
 𝑀0(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1 , 𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑗
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑗
𝑡) = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐶𝐻 = {
𝐷0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1,𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)
𝐷0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑗
𝑡,𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
} ∗ [
𝐷0
𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1,𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)
𝐷0
𝑡+1 (𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1,𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)
∗
𝐷0
𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡,𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
𝐷0
𝑡+1 (𝑥𝑗
𝑡,𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
]
1
2
= {𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐻} ∗  𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐶𝐻  (6) 
When TFPCH >1 (<1), it is implied that there is an increase (decrease) in productivity, while TFPCH=1 refers to 
cases where productivity is deemed unchanged. From equation (6), it is also shown that TFPCH is decomposed 
into the Efficiency Change (EFFCH) and Technology Change (TECHCH) sub-indices as explained by Färe et al. 
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(1994). The EFFCH ratio measures change in technical efficiency of a DMU relative to the best practice frontier. 
This shows whether unit 𝑗 moves towards or away from the production frontier over the period from 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1.  
A firm is deemed to be technically efficient if it is impossible to increase output without altering input usage. 
Specifically, efficiency is measured as the distance between the point the firm lies in the input–output space and 
the production frontier (technology) that envelops the data. The Technological Change (TECHCH) component is 
due to the variation of the production frontier between two periods and hence, exerts improvement or deterioration 
of the unit’s technology from 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1. The EFFCH is further decomposed into improvements in management 
practices or movements toward an optimal size. As suggested by Färe et al. (1994), the first refers to a measure of 
Pure Technical Efficiency Change (PECH), while the latter to a measure of Scale Efficiency Change (SECH): 
𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡,𝑡+1 =
𝐷𝑜,𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1,𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)
𝐷𝑜,𝑣
𝑡 (𝑥𝑗
𝑡,𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
, 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡,𝑡+1 =
𝐷𝑜,𝑐
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1,𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)∗𝐷𝑜,𝑣
𝑡 (𝑥𝑗
𝑡,𝑦𝑗
𝑡)
𝐷𝑜,𝑐
𝑡  (𝑥𝑗
𝑡,𝑦𝑗
𝑡)∗𝐷𝑜,𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑗
𝑡+1,𝑦𝑗
𝑡+1)
=>𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐻 =  𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐻 𝑥 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐻     (7) 
Here it should be noted that PECH is calculated relative to Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) technology, while the 
component of SECH is measured as the deviations between the VRS and CRS technologies. Therefore, the 
subscripts “o,v” and “o,c” specify VRS and CRS technologies applied respectively for this ‘enhanced 
decomposition’ (Casu et al., 2004). The adoption of CRS or VRS technology from an economic perspective alters 
the envelopment surface. CRS technology assumes that the output(s) will change proportionally to the change 
observed in the inputs, while VRS technology encompasses both increasing and decreasing returns to scale. 
Intuitively, VRS might seem more realistic, since arguing in favour of CRS means that banks are assumed to operate 
at an optimal scale (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). On the other hand, VRS technology solves the same problem of 
CRS by adding an extra constraint in the linear programming process (increasing computation needs), namely that 
the sum of λ’s is equal to unity. Many researchers suggest caution when adopting VRS for several reasons. For 
example, the model orientation becomes important, unlike the CRS case. In that sense, MPI applications seem more 
compatible with CRS, while the weight restriction can lead DMUs to operate with over- or under-fitted returns to 
scale (Soteriou and Zenios, 1999). Additionally, differences in banks’ size under VRS can lead to lead to 
overestimating large banks’ efficiencies (Berg et al., 1991; Noulas, 1997). Finally, Coelli et al. (2005, p. 80) suggest 
that the TFPCH measure remains practically the same in output-oriented MPI approaches like ours. Consequently, 
imposing importance to the orientation of the model through VRS seems unnecessary. For that reason, we opted to 
11 
 
calculate the main components (TFPCH, EFFCH and TECHCH) with CRS technology and apply VRS only to the 
enhanced decomposition (PECH, SECH)4. 
The non-parametric Malmquist index does not require the profit maximisation or the cost minimisation assumption. 
If the practitioner is using panel data, MPI allows the decomposition of productivity changes into two components 
(technical efficiency change or catching up to the frontier, and technological change or changes in the best practice). 
Moreover, DEA-MPI is able to derive the efficiency estimates, isolating DMUs’ efforts to catch up to the frontier 
(i.e., changes in technical efficiency - EFFCH)  from shifts in the frontier (i.e., technological change - TECHCH). 
This is particularly interesting in cases of bank efficiency studies, because the production frontier can shift upward 
or downward over time due to market structure (such as increased competition), innovation (i.e., technical 
progress), changes in regulatory policies (such as financial liberalisation), and severe financial disruptions and 
shocks (e.g., financial crises). This explains the extensive application of TFPCH in this strand of the literature (see 
amongst others Casu et al. (2004), Portela and Thanasoulis (2010), Duygun et al. (2016), Casu et al. (2016)).  
 
2.3 Second stage: DBTR 
For the second-stage of our analysis, we are motivated by the bootstrapping techniques on MPIs proposed by Simar 
and Wilson (1999). They propose a bootstrap estimation procedure for obtaining confidence intervals for input-
oriented indices Malmquist indices of productivity and their decompositions. In our case, we are interested for 
output-oriented MPIs that are interacted with environmental variables (two-stage approach). For that reason, we 
follow the influential work of Simar and Wilson (2007) to calculated bias-corrected scores. Specifically, Simar’s 
and Wilson’s (2007) algorithm two of left truncation is applied for this purpose.  The bias-corrected efficiency 
scores derived from the algorithm are then regressed on the set of environmental variables.  
In general, the problem is explained by a probability density function 𝑓(𝑥𝑗
𝑡, 𝑦𝑗
𝑡 , 𝑧𝑗
𝑡), where 𝑧𝑗
𝑡 the environmental 
variables each bank j is facing. The main assumption is that the original MPI efficiency score is given by 
( , ) 1    tj j jz   can be translated into the following regression specification 
                     1   tj j jz                                                 (8)  
                                                            
4 Here, it should be noted that all productivity scores are obtained from the software DEAP v2.1 developed by Coelli (1996), while 
the cross-section technology is applied. 
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Where ψ a smooth continuous function, 𝑧𝑗
𝑡 a vector of the environmental variables,   a vector of parameters 
estimated by maximum likelihood and 
2 )  j  a continuous iid random variable independent of 𝑧𝑗
𝑡. 
The steps of algorithm are presented below: 
Step 1: Using the original data in 𝑃𝑡, compute the  j  
Step 2: Apply maximum likelihood to obtain the estimates 
2,   of 
2,  in the truncated regression of  j
on 
t
jz for the observations where 1 j . 
Step 3: Loop over steps 3.1-3.4 1000 times to extract n sets of bootstrap estimates  
1000
*
1j jL L
B 

  : 
 Step 3.1: Draw 
2 )  j for each j=1,..,n with truncating left at (1 )
t
jz  . 
 Step 3.2: Again compute the 
*  tj j jz  for each j=1,..,n. 
 Step 3.3: Set 
*t t
j jx x  and  
* */t tj j j jy y   for each j=1,..,n. 
 Step 3.4: Calculate the 
*
j   based on the new production set
*tP obtained by all * *,t tj jx y  
Step 4: For each j=1,..,n.compute the bias-corrected  j using the jB and the original  j . 
Step 5: Apply the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of  j  on 
t
jz yielding
, . 
Step 6: Loop over steps 6.1-6.3 1000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates   
1000
* *
1
,j
L L
B

  : 
 Step 6.1: For each j=1,..,n draw )  j for each j=1,..,n with truncating left at (1 )
t
jz  . 
 Step 6.2: Again compute the 
**  tj j jz  for each j=1,..,n. 
Step 6.3: Apply the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of 
** j  on 
t
jz
 yielding
* *, . 
Step 7: Use , and jB to construct estimated confidence intervals for each element of   . 
 
The end of this procedure generates a set of bias-corrected estimates of efficiency estimates 
j jEff 
5, which 
consequently are applied as the final dependent variable in equation (8). For more mathematical details regarding 
this process the interested reader should refer to Simar and Wilson (2007). Finally, we should note that the FEAR 
package in R platform has been applied for the estimation of the DBTR (Wilson, 2008)6. 
                                                            
5 The repetition of the process provides a solid approximation of the true sampling distribution. 2000 bootstrap interactions are performed and the 
95-percent confidence intervals are constructed. Simar and Wilson (1999) provide the estimation of the smoothing bandwidth parameter as 
1/6(0.8* )h DMU . The scope of this paper is the application of the DBTR in order to evaluate how the bank-risk variables and financial 
development affect banks’ efficiency. From the DBTR we obtain bank specific bias-corrected estimates and confidence intervals for all banks of 
all countries and years. These are not presented for the shake of space and are available upon request. 
6 More specifically, the routines of boot.sw98, rnorm.trunc and treg. Alternatively, the same results can be obtained by the simarwilson routine 
from STATA software. 
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At this stage, several issues need to be pointed out in order to clarify the DBTR process. Firstly, the main argument 
in favour of Simar’s and Wilson’s (2007) work derives from the way efficiency scores are used. As the original 
efficiency scores are not directly observed and the two-stage procedure is affected by explanatory variables not 
used in the first-stage, it must be accepted that the error terms will be serially correlated to the explanatory variables. 
This ‘correlation arises in finite samples from the fact that perturbations of observations lying on the estimate 
frontier will in many, and perhaps all, cases cause changes in efficiencies estimated for other observations.’ (see 
Simar and Wilson (2007, p.33). Secondly, algorithm two is preferred over algorithm one. Simar and Wilson (2007) 
explain that the latter aims at improving inference, but it does not take under consideration the bias term (
( ) ( )j j jBIAS E    ). Essentially, steps one and two of algorithm two are the same in algorithm one, but steps 
three and four employ an extra parametric bootstrap in order to produce estimates improved in terms of statistical 
significance and bias. Additionally, the authors conclude that this improvement comes at a low computational cost 
compared to algorithm one.  
Thirdly, we mention in the introduction section that several similar studies calculate the efficiency scores and then 
without further consideration regress them with environmental variables. This is done usually with Tobit, simple 
OLS, GMM or GLS censored regressions. This is based on the fact that efficiency scores are bounded between 
zero and unity, therefore it is expected that the estimates will be biased unless censored. The crucial difference, 
though, is that from a truncated normal distribution the errors that fall below (1 )tjz  are not observed, unlike in 
censored models like the Tobit one. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2011) and Wanke and Barros (2017) suggest that in 
two-stage approaches employing small size datasets there is high probability for downward bias pushing many 
efficiency scores to zero. Based on the above, the left-truncated approach (bounding the unbounded MPI scores 
above unity) is a ‘safer’ one econometrically speaking. Finally, given that the cost input variables are considered 
endogenous (Lensink and Meesters, 2014), the utilization of bias-corrected estimates in a stochastic setting 
provides extra safety against the traditional endogeneity issues observed in regression specifications incorporating 
firm-level data (Van Biesebroeck, 2008). 
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2.3.1 DBTR specifications 
By applying the DBTR this study aims to investigate the extent to which bank-specific characteristics have an 
impact on domestic banks efficiency at the periphery of the Euro area. Using the unbiased efficiency estimates and 
following previous literature on bank efficiency (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Brissimis et al., 2008), we form the 
following baseline DBTR specification:   
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑎
′𝑋′𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑌′𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑗𝑡                                                   (9) 
Where 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the bootstrapped bias-corrected efficiency scores of a bank j at time t, c is a constant term, 𝑋′𝑗𝑡 
comprises a vector of bank-specific financial variables assumed to capture the impact of financial risk on the level 
of bank efficiency, 𝑌′𝑗𝑡 is a vector of firm-specific and macroeconomic control variables and 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is the error term 
which includes the unobserved bank-specific effect and the idiosyncratic error.  
To capture the role of risk in the second stage regressions, we differentiate between four different types of risk, 
namely capital, liquidity, profit and credit risk. The selection of these variables (vector  𝑋′) follow the CAMEL-
based framework as in Doumpos et al. (2017)7. Capital risk (CapitalR) is defined as the ratio of equity to total 
assets, to measure banks’ capital strength. Higher levels of capital (lower capital risk) are associated with a safety 
net for banks as capital refers to the quantity of funds available to support their business (see Athanasoglou et al., 
2008). Hence, it would be expected that more efficient banks are more capitalised, using less leverage, and have 
lower costs of bankruptcy and as a result have a lower need for external funding. Liquidity risk (LiquidityR) is 
defined as the ratio of total loans over total assets. If banks are not able to liquidate some of their assets or raise 
funds from new external sources at reasonable costs, they might be unable to meet their financial obligations (Casu 
et al., 2016). Thus, banks with higher liquidity risk are expected to experience lower efficiency levels.  The key 
profitability risk ratio (ProfitR) is defined as the ratio of net income over total assets and it capture banks’ levels of 
profitability. We hypothesise that higher levels of profits may increase banks’ efficiency, as higher profits lead 
banks to generate returns on their assets of portfolio (Sufian, 2014). Finally, credit risk is measured as the ratio of 
loan-loss provisions to loans. Higher levels of credit risk are normally associated with lower levels of profitability 
                                                            
7 According to Poghosyan and Čihák (2009), the CAMEL variables (where CAMEL stands for “Capital, Asset quality, Management, 
Earnings, and Liquidity”) should be able to capture distress signals of banks. In our case, we follow these principles but we do not 
include expenses management ratios (i.e. cost to income), because these variables are used in the profit-oriented DEA of the first 
stage of our analysis. 
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(Brissimis, et al. 2008). Hence, a negative relationship between credit risk and efficiency levels of banks is 
expected. 
The control variables (vector 𝑌′) are chosen based on the existing empirical literature on bank efficiency. To control 
for the extent of economies of scale, we add Size measured as the logarithm of banks’ real total assets. There is a 
consensus that larger size may decrease the costs of gathering and processing information (Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2008). Hence, we expect a positive relation between size and efficiency. Furthermore, the real GDP 
growth (GDPg) is introduced to control for the macroeconomic environment and demand factors. It is expected 
that it will be positively associated with banks’ efficiency levels. Finally, our specifications account for the effects 
of inflation. The relation between bank efficiency and inflation is not clear. If inflation is anticipated (not 
anticipated) could mean that banks are able (not able) to adjust their interest rates and as a consequence raise 
(decrease) revenues at a faster pace than costs (Perry, 1992). Given the above motivation for our baseline model, 
we go further to investigate the extent to which, banks efficiency levels differ in the sovereign debt crisis years 
compared to more tranquil periods.  To do so, a financial crisis dummy (Crisis) is initially included as below: 
        𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑎
′𝑋′𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑌′𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑗𝑡                            (10) 
Crisis takes the value of one for the period between 2010 and 2012, and zero otherwise. Equation (10) aims to 
capture the marginal effect of the crisis on banks’ efficiency, assuming everything else constant (direct effect). The 
next step is to evaluate whether the sovereign debt crisis may also have an indirect effect by magnifying the impact 
of the internal factors on domestic banks efficiency levels. To this end, the equation below includes interaction 
terms between the three different types of risk and the crisis dummy: 
                                          𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑎
′𝑋′𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜕
′𝑋′𝑗𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽
′𝑌′𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑗𝑡                    (11) 
Comparing the coefficients on the two interaction terms allows us to assess whether changes in bank specific-
characteristics have a different impact on banks’ efficiency. This test is motivated by the 2010-2012 events, which 
led periphery banks of the Euro area to tighten their credit standards as sovereign risk increased and worsened 
bank’s balance sheets (Acharya et al., 2016). 
The final analysis of this study tests whether changes in the different types of risks in- and out- of the crisis period 
affect differently the domestic banks’ efficiency, taking into account countries’ level of capital market development 
(FD). We use the degree of stock market capitalisation as a sorting device. Stock market capitalisation to GDP is 
an efficient measure of stock market size. Larger stock markets are considered to have higher mobility of capital 
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and less volatility of risk (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996). The countries in our sample are classified into more 
and less financially developed based on the average stock market capitalisation to GDP. Hence, countries above 
(below) the mean of stock market capitalisation are more (less) financially developed. 8 We interact the vector of 
risk measures with a FD and (1-FD) terms respectively. Thus, the final DBTR regression is specified as follows: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑎
′𝑋′𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝜕
′𝑋′𝑗𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡) ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔𝑋
′
𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐹𝐷𝑡) + 
𝜏′𝑋′𝑗𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡) ∗ (1 − 𝐹𝐷𝑡) + 𝛽
′𝑌′𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑗𝑡        (12) 
We hypothesise that the Euro area larger bank balance sheets and smaller capital markets are directly related 
phenomena. Considering that periphery banks interrupted lines of credit due to liquidity problems during the crisis 
and that their access to capital markets is low, we expect that bank-specific risk variables exert a higher (lower) 
impact on bank efficiency during the crisis for lower (higher) levels of financial development. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The data for this study is obtained from different sources including the Bankscope database, World Bank and World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The data cover 64 banks in five Euro area periphery economies- Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain-during the 2007-2014 period. To construct our balanced bank-level dataset (DEA 
input/outputs – vectors X and Y) , we use the 2015 version of the Bankscope database.9 The dataset includes only 
domestic commercial banks. As Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) suggest, selection of only commercial banks allow 
us to avoid issues of comparison between different type of banks such as savings, investment and cooperative 
banks. Following the standard procedure (Guariglia et al., 2015), we use only consolidated figures to the extent 
possible to avoid double counting. To control for potential outliers, observations below the 0.5 percentile and above 
the 99.5 percentile are removed. Annual data on GDP growth and inflation come from the World Bank Database. 
                                                            
8 We have also employed different proxies for FD, for example, the level of concentration and the ratio of stock market capitalisation 
to total assets of the deposit money banks. Results remain robust to the ones presented for the FD proxy. Results are available upon 
request.  
9 The number of banks per country are as follows: Greece (5), Ireland (4), Italy (37), Portugal (6) and Spain (12). The collected data 
are from 2006-2014, but we can only report efficiency scores from 2007 as one year is lost for the calculation of the original MPI 
scores. Finally, using Bankscope has two main advantages. First, it accounts for about 90% of total assets in each country. Second, 
all information is provided in standardised format, which allows us to compare information within a country as well as across 
countries. 
17 
 
Table 1 below presents the summary statistics for all the variables, which are implemented in the first and second 
stage models. <insert Table 1>   
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the DEA inputs and all bank efficiency determinants used in this 
analysis. We find that domestic banks in Greece and Spain present the highest average levels of interest expenses 
and operating expenses when compared with their periphery counterparts. Over the sample period, Italian and 
Spanish banks present higher capital and liquidity risk ratios. Greek banks display the largest average values of 
credit risk whereas Ireland banks show a negative average profitability ratio. Overall, these preliminary results shed 
light on the idea that local periphery banks were largely exposed to their own countries sovereign debt leading to a 
deterioration of their assets quality, and therefore increasing their risk of default. This is consistent with Acharya 
and Steffen (2015) according to which domestic periphery banks shift from safer to riskier government bond by 
placing a bet on their own survival. More specifically, Acharya et al. (2016) claim that during the sovereign debt 
crisis, domestic periphery banks increased their exposure to government bonds transferring their risk to government 
defaults. This is also discussed by Crosignani (2015) who shows that domestic banks of the periphery raised their 
exposure to government bonds by 32% from $19.3 to $25.7 billions.  In terms of GDPg and INF, it is obvious that 
Italy, Greece and Portugal present on average negative growth and relatively high inflation. The highest inflation 
is observed in the case of Ireland, but it is also followed by the highest GDP growth. 
Data on financial development are obtained from the WDI version of April 2017, described in Beck et al. (2003). 
In line with the literature on financial development, we use an aggregated indicator which proxies for financial 
development. We use one indicator capturing the development of the stock market which provides the so-called 
“arm’s-length finance” (Levine, 2006). This indicator is a proxy for the size of the stock market. A larger market 
size indicates that investors are confident in the ability of the markets to channel funds into the most efficient 
projects (Tsoukas, 2011). The evolution of financial development indicators over time is provided in Figure 1. 
<insert figure 1> 
For comparison purposes, we illustrate FD ratios over the whole sample period for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain, along with the ones for US. It is observed that during this time period, Euro area economies have a 
lower stock market indicator when compared to the most financially developed markets such as the American ones. 
We also observe a sharp decline during the global financial crisis in 2007-2009 for all countries. During the 
sovereign debt crisis period of 2010-2012 periphery countries’ ratios continue to further drop, with the exception 
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of Ireland. The figure illustrates that US stock markets are more liquid than Eurozone periphery ones, which may 
reflect the greater capital market development of the former. This is consistent with the idea that Eurozone 
economies, and especially those at the periphery of the Euro, have barely grown their capital markets during the 
period under study and that their financial structure has become strongly bank-based (loan-based finance). This 
could suggest that less market-oriented economies are more exposed to risk. Overall, these preliminary results show 
that banks’ efficiency levels may be related to the level of risk they face, the financial crisis and the level of capital 
market development. In light of the above, in the next section we summarize all the empirical results obtained from 
DEA-MPI and DBTR analyses and contextualize the relations between these variables. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 First-stage results: DEA-MPI 
 
The DEA-MPI results are presented in this section. As mentioned earlier, following Färe et al. (1994) the TFPCH 
is decomposed into its components EFFCH, TECHCH, PECH and SECH. This decomposition is valuable for our 
empirical setting, since it provides insight on the sources of overall productivity change in the domestic periphery 
banks. Practitioners can extract valuable information from evaluating the original MPI scores, rather than the 
bootstrapped ones, as bootstrapping is done usually to avoid serial correlation observed when the original scores 
are interacted with environmental variables.  These estimates are summarized in Table 2. <Insert Table 2> 
Overall, from the original DEA-MPI estimates several interesting findings are observed. Throughout the whole 
sample period, peripheral domestic banks exhibit improvement in their efficiency. This result is consistent with 
most of the components across countries. For example, Portuguese banks exert the highest productivity growth of 
2.5% during 2007-2014, while Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland follow with 2.2%, 2.1%, 1.9% and 1.2% 
respectively. From the decomposition of the MPI, this growth is driven mostly from the technological component 
(TECHCH) rather than the technical efficiency one. For example, Italian TFPCH is driven by +1.4% in 
technological efficiency and +0.2% in technical efficiency. Similar results are observed across all countries, except 
Spain where banks seem to ‘catch up’ to the frontier and turn towards the best practice in a similar fashion (+1.2% 
and +1.1% respectively). The decomposition into PECH and SECH shows different trends, but mostly that 
peripheral banks are improving their technical efficiency through the pure technical efficiency changes rather than 
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scale ones. For example, in Greece the 0.6% increase in EFFCH is driven by the 0.7% increase in PECH (as SECH 
is decreasing by 0.2%). 
Examining the results in the pre-, post- and during the –Eurozone crisis, we see a clear pattern in the efficiency 
estimates. Namely, from 2007-2009 domestic banks’ efficiency is increasing overall. During the 2010-2012 crisis 
period the picture is vastly changing as high contractions in all efficiency metrics are observed. This is expected, 
as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis vastly affected domestic banks’ operations. This can be explained by the fact 
that peripheral domestic banks became susceptible to a “moral suasion mechanism”. As described in Ongena et al. 
(2016), during this time peripheral governments prompted domestic banks to purchase additional amounts of 
domestic sovereign bonds and as a consequence became more exposed to their sovereign debt. In 2013-2014 a 
recovery in efficiency is observed. Between December 2011 and June 2014, banks had unlimited access to central 
bank liquidity, as long-term financing operations (LTRO) were done at a fixed rate. These LTROs targeted banks 
in GIIPS. According to Claeys (2014), the LTROs supported bank liquidity ensuring the finance of banks, 
subsidising the banking system and restoring its profitability. The estimated TFPCHs in Greece are indicative of 
the aforementioned clear pattern. In 2009 a +3.5% in productivity growth is observed, the same figure drops by 
4.8% in 2011 and reverses in 2013 by a +3.1%. The worst results in terms of the different metrics of efficiency 
during the crisis are presented in the case of Italians and Spanish banks. This is expected as it is known that Italian 
and Spanish domestic banks actively purchased higher amounts of sovereign debt during the crisis than the rest of 
the periphery banks (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). The patterns observed in the whole sample regarding the different 
efficiency components remain similar when looking at the different periods and across countries. This is also 
illustrated by the following figure. <insert figure 2> 
The above results provide a relatively uniform shape in the way domestic banks’ efficiency is evolving through 
time in the Eurozone periphery countries. Many researchers raise the question of whether European banking 
markets are integrated, homogenous and comparable. Usually, the presented results are mixed (see amongst others 
Weill (2004), Berger (2007), Bos and Schmiedel (2007) and Casu et al. (2016)). Our results are in a way in line 
with some of the results of Casu et al. (2004) and Casu et al. (2016). To the best of our knowledge, though, this is 
the first study that provides clear evidence of the existence of an efficiency meta-frontier specifically for European 
peripheral domestic banks. Given the above, it is now even more interesting to see how these results are affected 
by accounting for different bank- and country- specific variables. These are presented in the following section. 
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4.2 Second-stage results: DBTR empirical findings  
4.2.1 Baseline models 
Table 3 reports the DBTR estimates for the baseline specifications (equation 10). The empirical findings are 
provided for all five estimated elements of DEA-MPI efficiency (EFFCH, TECHCH, PECH, SECH and TFPCH 
in column 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively). <insert Table 3>  
Starting with capital risk (CapitalR), it positively affects the efficiency of domestic banks. More capitalised banks 
(financed with less leverage) are more efficient and face lower costs of going bankrupt over the 2006-2014 period. 
The relationship between capital risk and bank efficiency is not only statistically significant but also economically 
important. To illustrate the effect, let us consider the coefficient of CapitalR as shown in Column 2 of Table 3.  The 
coefficient of 0.582 implies an elasticity of changes into best practice of the banks, evaluated at sample means of 
0.044. A 10 percent increase of capital risk increases the banks technical efficiency by 0.44 percent. This is in line 
with previous studies (Sufian, 2014). 
The results regarding liquidity risk are uniform across all estimated equations, demonstrating a negative and 
statistically significant relationship. It seems that there is a positive relationship between banks’ efficiency and the 
level of liquid assets held by the banks. Since higher figures of the ratio indicate lower liquidity, the empirical 
findings imply that domestic banks which are less liquid are also less productive. The economic significance of 
this variable is clear. The coefficient in Column 3 of -0.141 implies an elasticity of technology changes, evaluated 
at sample means of -0.063. A 10 percent increase of liquidity risk reduces TECHCH by 0.63 percent. The above 
discussion is in line with the argument that banks with higher loans in their assets portfolios increase the cost for 
their screening and monitoring, since loans are the assets leading to high operational costs (Naceur and Ghazouani, 
2007). 
The coefficients of ProfitR, the proxy for the degree of banks’ profitability, are positive and significant for all 
measures of bank efficiency. This suggests that higher levels of profits increase the ability of banks to be more 
efficient. This finding is also economically important. Looking, for example, at the coefficient of ProfitR in column 
4, it indicates that a 10 percent increase of profitability raises the technology that shapes banks towards the best 
practice by 0.030 percent. This is in line with our expectations, since evidence presented by other studies such as 
Chortareas et al. (2013) and Sufian (2014) also reveal a positive effect of ROA on banks’ efficiency.  
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Credit risk (CreditR) exerts a negative effect and it has a highly statistically significant impact on banks’ level of 
efficiency for all models. Greater credit risk reduces the degree of bank efficiency. This illustrates the common 
knowledge that banks attempt to maximise their efficiency by adopting a risk-averse behaviour, which improves 
their screening process and tightens their risky loans’ monitoring. The magnitude of this effect is also economically 
relevant. Considering column 6, the coefficient on credit risk denotes an elasticity evaluated at sample means of -
0.008. Hence, a 10 percent increase of credit risk contributes to a decline of the overall efficient of the banks of 
0.08 percent. This is in line with other studies which find a negative effect for Brazilian banks (Staub, 2010) and 
Greek banks (Athanasoglou, 2008 and Delis and Papanikolau, 2009). 
With respect to our bank-specific controls, Size (i.e. the log of total assets) exhibits a positive and a statistically 
significant relation with bank efficiency for all the models in Table 3. This finding is in line with previous 
theoretical and empirical evidence, which shows that banks with larger size reduce the cost of gathering and 
processing information (Staub et al., 2010). Finally, looking at the other control variables, it is clear that 
macroeconomic factors such as GDPg (INF) exert a positive (negative) and statistically significant effect on banks’ 
efficiency. The point estimates on inflation provide evidence that domestic banks are not able to target inflation 
correctly, which may lead to imperfect interest rate adjustment and potential losses (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007). The positive effect of GDP growth is consistent with the well-known argument that economic growth is 
associated with positive performance of the financial sector (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Finally, trend 
components are taken under consideration as a robustness check. The results obtained are consistent with the results 
of Table 3 and are presented in the Appendix. 
 
4.2.2 Direct and indirect effects of the crisis on banking efficiency 
To account for the role of the sovereign debt crisis on banks’ efficiency, we focus on its direct effect (equation 11). 
The aim is to evaluate the marginal impact of the crisis on the level of efficiency of domestic banks. Results are 
presented in the following Table 4.  <insert Table 4> 
The coefficients of the control variables retain their signs and significance after controlling for the direct effect of 
the crisis. The main risk variables also have the same significant effect. More importantly, the financial crisis 
attracts a negative and statistically significant effect for all different measures. Considering that the sovereign debt 
crisis led to a deterioration in the sovereigns’ creditworthiness and consequently decreased the value of the banks’ 
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large domestic government bond holdings (Acharya et al., 2016), we consider this as an expected outcome. This 
outcome is also in line with the work of Acharya and Steffen (2015) and Ongena et al. (2016) on European domestic 
banks mentioned in section 4.1. Additionally, as with our baseline model, we account for trend components as a 
robustness check. Once again these results are in line with the results of Table 4 and are presented in the Appendix. 
Both robustness checks (baseline models/direct crisis effects) outlined in the Appendix prove that banks’ 
productivity follows a parabolic trend with a trough in 2010-2012. The next step involves including interactions 
between the four types of risk and the crisis term as in equation 11. This illustrates the indirect effect of the crisis 
to the operations of peripheral domestic banks. These results are presented in Table 5. <insert Table 5> 
Comparing the role of capital risk during and outside of the crisis, we observe that bank efficiency is more sensitive 
to changes in the level of equity in the crisis. In other words, during the crisis banks are less capitalised (finance 
with more0.220 leverage) and as a result are less efficient. The smaller positive effect of capital risk on banks’ 
efficiency during the crisis means that banks face higher costs of going bankrupt, and therefore have a higher need 
for external funding which results in lower efficiency levels.  
The vulnerability of banks to this position was highlighted with the onset of the Global financial crisis. In 2008, all 
banks in the Euro area were forced to enter into a deleveraging process and build more capital-intensive assets to 
reduce risk-weighted assets. However, banks at the periphery reshuffled their portfolio to sovereign bonds to relieve 
pressure on capital ratios and did not actually deleverage. This implication is consistent with the influential speech 
of Praet (2012), but also with the discussion paper of Lenarčič et al. (2016). 
Banks’ efficiency levels are more sensitive to changes in the level of liquidity in the crisis period. The liquidity 
ratio exerts a higher (lower) impact during (outside) of the crisis. This is a novel result which suggests that there 
was an increase of risk during the sovereign debt crisis affecting banks’ liquidity risk and as a consequence their 
efficiency levels. The magnitude and the significance of the coefficients on the interactions with the crisis dummy 
are larger than the corresponding coefficients relative to the non-crisis period. These results confirm our hypothesis 
that the adverse effects of the sovereign debt crisis exert a stronger negative effect on the level of liquidity of banks. 
Banks’ large share of sovereign bond holdings increases their liquidity risk and therefore diminishes their efficiency 
levels. This implication is consistent with Acharya et al. (2016) who finds that banks in the GIIPS counties saw 
their levels of risk increasing as they held higher amounts of domestic government debt. 
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Turning to the remaining interaction terms, ROA still exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on two 
measures of banks efficiency. However, the effect is lower during the financial crisis than out of it. This is an 
expected result, as banks tend to be more productive, when they are able to attract higher levels of deposits and 
find creditworthy borrowers. During the sovereign debt crisis, periphery banks faced lower levels of profits and 
were induced to buy sovereign debt securities to improve their level of profitability (Ongena et al., 2016). Credit 
risk continues to have a negative effect on bank efficiency which appears stronger during the crisis than outside. 
This means that non-performing loans have a higher negative effect on bank efficiency during the crisis. In other 
words, periphery banks with higher credit risk tend to be less efficient during the crisis than outside the crisis 
period. This is expected as periphery banks are exposed to more high-risk loans during the crisis, which 
consequently can increase their vulnerability. This finding is in line with previous empirical evidence which shows 
that the changes in sovereign debt in countries such as Portugal and Greece positively affects banks credit risk 
(Acharya et al., 2016). 
 
4.2.3 Financial development effects on banking efficiency 
Having identified a direct and indirect effect of the financial crisis between risk ratios and banks’ efficiency levels, 
we also take into account whether this link varies according to the financial development level of the countries in 
which the banks are located. Table 6 shows the estimates for the interaction terms between the financial risk ratios 
and FD and (1-FD) dummies. The results reveal the heterogeneity between countries which is masked in the 
estimates for the full sample. We start with the discussion of the results presented for capital risk ratio. Our results 
seem to suggest that bank efficiency is more sensitive to changes in the capital risk ratio for lower levels of 
financially development and during the crisis. Banks in less (more) financial developed economies are less (more) 
efficient as they are more (less) likely to have higher (lower) leverage increasing their insolvency risk.  
Next, we compare the coefficients of LiquidityR.  Results indicate that the magnitude and significance of the 
interactions with the 1-FD term are larger than the corresponding coefficients related to the FD term. It shows that 
liquidity risk exerts a higher impact on banks’ efficiency for lower levels of financial development, especially 
during the crisis. This is an important result since it suggests that banks highly exposed to their countries sovereign 
debt have higher liquidity risk ratios and as a result, they have more difficulties in raising funds from new external 
sources which reflects their lower levels of efficiency. When profit risk (ProfitR) is considered, it is clear that banks 
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efficiency levels are lower during the crisis and for lower levels of financial development. Finally, credit risk has 
a higher negative impact on banks’ efficiency levels during the crisis and for lower levels of financial development.  
Overall, the above empirical findings provide new evidence on the importance of the development of a capital 
market system for banks and the economy as whole. Financial development decreases the effect of risk ratios on 
banks’ efficiency. The message is clear. Capital markets reduce financing frictions, as they enable banks to raise 
additional equity to expand their lending scope and therefore their efficiency levels. However, domestic banks at 
the periphery of the Euro area are not able to raise finance through these channels, as capital markets are small 
within the Eurozone. Therefore, moving towards a more market-based financial system would lead to faster 
changes in monetary policy decisions, given that banks’ adjustments of lending rates are known to be slow 
(Constâncio, 2016). Our findings confirm the view that the banking system and capital markets should become 
further integrated and complementary to each other. The importance of that is crucial, given the background of 
periphery domestic banks’ operations. Lenarčič et al. (2016) point out that sovereign exposures receive a zero risk 
weight in EU legislation and there are no limits imposed on concentration risk. Although this used to be explained 
by the historical links between the sovereign and the domestic banking sector, this justification is problematic in 
view of the recent financial crisis and should be changed through the BASEL III requirements. The reason for that 
is that domestic banks appear as the only reliable source of funding of the sovereign in times of crisis. Overall, this 
study provides new insights in terms of policy for the Euro area, which are of extreme importance for the adoption 
of BASEL III framework and the implementation of the CMU.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The motivation of this study is to examine the efficiency of domestic banks in the periphery of the Euro area and 
evaluate the effects of bank-risk determinants on their performance during the period of 2007-2014. This is 
achieved with a two-stage empirical analysis. Initially, we calculate DEA-MPI efficiency scores in terms of TFPCH 
and its components for all the European peripheral economies. In order to avoid bias in these estimations, we 
combine the novel principles of the truncated regression with a double bootstrap process. Thus, the DBTR is applied 
using the MPI bias-corrected values for each one of the efficiency components. The second stage regressions based 
on a balanced panel allow us to examine whether changes in the financial conditions of peripheral European banks 
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affect differently their efficiency levels. This is done by accounting for the period in and out-of-the European 
sovereign debt crisis and for different levels of financial development in the respective countries. Specifically, we 
focus on bank-level risk characteristics which the literature suggests as important factors in shaping banks’ 
operations.   
In terms of the results, the DEA-MPI analysis provides solid indications that a domestic banks’ efficiency meta-
frontier exists within the peripheral economies. The DBTR results show that higher levels of liquidity and credit 
risk exert a negative effect on banks’ efficiency levels, whereas capital and profit risk has a positive impact in 
banks’ performance. The crisis is also found to magnify the effect of bank risk variables, which negatively impact 
the efficiency of domestic banks. Most importantly, when accounting for the indirect effect of financial 
development, we clearly find that bank-risk variables exert a higher impact on banks’ efficiency for lower levels 
of financial development during the crisis.  
Overall, this study postulates that different bank efficiency metrics can be considered as early warning indicators 
of financial instability and potentially used as macroeconomic tools to evaluate the financial system, but only under 
the condition of bias-corrected DEA estimates. This work also fills a clear gap in the respective literature, namely 
the effects of capital market development and recent sovereign debt crisis in banks’ productivity. Recent speeches 
from European Central Bank, European Stability Mechanism and EC officials suggest that not enough reforms and 
regulations have been in place in order to move away from a loan-based European market and deepen financial 
integration, as the CMU vision dictates. Our results indicate that this shift in European policies needs to be enforced, 
with particular focus on the stressed peripheral economies.  
Over the past decades researchers aiming at evaluating efficiency have substantially contributed to the body of 
knowledge of expert and intelligent systems. It is interesting to see that DEA applications vary in different areas 
like business management, banking, transportation, health etc. (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2005; Tortosa-Ausina et al., 
2008; Wanke and Barros, 2017; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2011). Their popularity in this literature is based on the fact 
they provide interpretable and transparent solutions compatible with real world applications. As such, they attract 
the interest of mainstream industry players, policy makers and academic researchers, unlike other techniques that 
appear complex in design and ‘black boxes’ in process interpretation (e.g. artificial intelligence techniques, neural 
networks, heuristics and meta-heuristics approaches).  
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This study is offering such a solution on approaching domestic banking in the European periphery for ECB policy 
makers. Namely, an econometrically robust cross-country analysis assessing the productivity changes in the GIIPS 
and the effects of economic turmoil and capital market restrictions on their efficiency. This separates our work 
from others in the field. Earlier banking studies attempt to evaluate efficiency on a single stage and country. 
Namely, efficiency scores are calculated in an attempt to evaluate efficiency through a time period. Although this 
provides insight on the effort of banks to reach a ‘best-practice’ frontier, their representation is static in a sense, as 
factors affecting these changes are not explored. This can lead authors to overstretch arguments on what might 
have driven efficiency boosts or booms. Recently, other researchers identify the above issue and proceed to second-
stage regressions. But in most of these cases the estimated efficiency scores are directly regressed with 
environmental variables, which leads to clear regression misspecifications, biased results and high probability of 
endogeneity. The proposed DBTR is able to cope with the above issues. Finally, there are a few banking studies 
proposing similar Simar and Wilson (2007) approaches like ours. None of the them, though, pay attention 
specifically to GIPPSs’ domestic banks. In our opinion, this is very important as those banks suffered greatly from 
the “moral suasion mechanism” (Ongena et al., 2016) during the crisis, the effects of which are magnified by the 
levels of financial development observed in peripheral economies. 
Nonetheless, this study presents some limitations. The MPI scores used are not the only option for calculating 
efficiency scores. Although clearly motivated, the choice of an output-oriented approach with profit-based 
input/output selection and CSR assumption is not the only one. Additionally, our dataset’s timespan does not cover 
the years of relative financial stability in the periphery after 2014. Finally, we do not perform meta-frontier analysis. 
The frank account of the above limitations projects some clear future research suggestions. This study can be further 
expanded by comparing DEA-MPI with other stochastic approaches, such as Stochastic Frontier and Meta-frontier 
methods. A comparative analysis between several DEA approaches including bounded efficiency scores between 
zero and unity, input-oriented structures and VSR assumption would further validate the findings of this work. 
Evaluating the efficiency of private banks alongside with the domestic ones could solidify the existence of a meta-
frontier in GIIPS. In conclusion, it would be interesting to examine the effects of the new measures of BASEL III 
implemented in January 2014. This is not possible at the moment due to banking data unavailability, but it will be 
attainable in the near future. 
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Appendix: Trend components robustness checks 
 
Our estimates thus far show that bank-risk variables exert an effect on banks’ productivity. As a robustness check 
of our main results, we assess whether banks’ productivity levels change over time. To do so, the variable Year, 
the number of years since 2007, and its quadratic form (i.e., Year*Year) are included in the equation models (9) 
and (10). Including these variables in the estimation models, enable us to test for non-linear and possible non-
monotonic trend in the productivity levels of domestic banks over two distinct periods, i.e., the pre- and post-crisis. 
In other words, we test whether domestic banks suffer a decline in productivity during the financial crisis while 
improving productivity afterwards. Hence, we expect the coefficient of Year to be negative and the coefficient of 
Year*Year to be positive. The obtained results from this analysis are shown below. 
<insert Table A.1 and A.2> 
Table A.1 indicates that the estimated coefficient on Year (Year*Year) is negative (positive) and statistically 
significant. This indicates that productivity changes of domestic banks have a trend shape of a parabola over time. 
When including the dummy crisis (Table A.2), the results are similar suggesting that the crisis effect remains 
without altering the picture of a parabola shape. More importantly, these findings show that the U-shape has its 
trough during the 2010-2012 period. This result is more pronounced for the EFFCH proxy of banks’ productivity, 
as shown by the Year and Year*Year coefficients. This further validates the findings of Figure 2 in the descriptive 
statistics. 
Overall, the empirical findings of Table A.1 and Table A.2 are robust to those of Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. 
CapitalR (LiquidityR) and ProfitR (CreditR) retain their positive (negative) significant effect on banks’ efficiency 
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levels and the coefficients on the bank-specific variables retain similar magnitudes. For example, the coefficient of 
LiquidityR (-0.180) of Table 3 (column 2) indicates that a 10 percent increase of liquidity risk reduces EFFCH by 
0.78 percent. The equivalent coefficient of Table A.1 (-0.178) denotes that a 10 percent increase of liquidity risk 
diminishes EFFCH by 0.74 percent. Similar is the picture of the magnitude changes between the coefficients in 
Table 4 and A.2. Examining the individual components of Table A.1, bank-risk variables exert overall a higher 
significant impact on banks EFFCH than for each of the other components. For instance, the coefficient of ProfitR 
in column 2 of Table A.1 (0.292) implies that a 10 percent increase of profitability leads to an increase of EFFCH 
by 0.052 percent. However, the coefficient for PECH (0.113) indicates that a 10 percent increase of profitability 
raises PECH by 0.022 percent. When considering the direct impact of the crisis, the magnitude and significance of 
the bank-risk variables are similar in both Table 4 and Table A.2. The crisis exerts a negative and statistically 
significant impact on banks’ efficiency levels, but this magnitude is relatively higher in Table A.2. Nevertheless, 
TFPCH continues to be the most affected of the five components from the direct effect of the crisis.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Countries  
 
Statistics 
DEA Inputs DEA Output Bank Efficiency Determinants Macroeconomic Factors 
Interest 
Expenses  
Operating 
Expenses  
Total 
Income  
CapitalR LiquidityR ProfitR CreditR Size GDPg INF 
Greece Mean 2.334 1.512 5.099 0.075 0.064 0.005 0.027 18.39 -0.425 78.45 
Median 2.309 1.440 4.573 0.073 0.643 0.007 0.018 18.45 -0.300 83.00 
Min 0.904 0.605 2.053 0.055 0.557 -0.022 0.004 17.41 -5.500 65.00 
Max 5.103 2.530 8.383 0.115 0.698 0.020 0.104 18.99 5.700 85.00 
Stdev 1.096 0.633 0.605 0.015 0.041 0.012 0.027 0.407 3.933 8.179 
Ireland  Mean 2.100 0.919 3.746 0.070 0.574 -0.008 0.016 17.78 0.805 122.86 
Median 0.076 0.113 0.257 0.058 0.659 0.003 0.009 17.59 -0.500 121.00 
Min 0.227 0.004 0.322 0.033 0.100 -0.641 -0.003 16.11 -4.600 117.00 
Max 7.134 2.159 11.400 0.195 0.881 0.009 0.073 18.89 8.500 132.00 
Stdev 1.978 0.794 3.275 0.042 0.247 0.022 0.232 0.935 4.146 5.082 
Italy Mean 1.164 1.202 2.983 0.090 0.614 0.005 0.011 15.66 -0.621 93.94 
Median 0.307 0.195 0.536 0.076 0.655 0.004 0.007 15.50 0.100 95.00 
Min 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.020 0.039 -0.059 -0.002 11.22 -5.500 89.00 
Max 36.100 19.300 61.900 0.395 0.960 0.029 0.081 20.81 2.000 96.00 
Stdev 4.050 3.535 9.212 0.051 0.219 0.008 0.011 1.960 2.330 2.330 
Portugal Mean 1.415 0.819 2.638 0.069 0.541 0.005 0.015 16.81 -0.283 72.40 
Median 0.307 0.195 0.536 0.059 0.639 0.004 0.009 16.06 0.200 73.00 
Min 0.004 0.003 0.013 0.034 0.084 -0.012 0.001 13.23 -4.000 69.00 
Max 5.244 2.099 8.589 0.157 0.891 0.024 0.0488 18.95 2.500 75.00 
Stdev 1.500 0.844 2.738 0.032 0.236 0.008 0.014 1.875 2.160 1.809 
Spain Mean 3.714 2.319 8.557 0.081 0.608 0.006 0.008 17.36 0.074 87.46 
Median 0.555 0.392 0.888 0.062 0.672 0.004 0.006 17.03 -0.400 87.00 
Min 0.004 0.004 0.030 0.014 0.033 -0.024 -0.001 2.112 -3.600 82.00 
Max 38.000 17.200 69.400 0.273 0.931 0.035 0.046 20.92 4.200 92.00 
Stdev 7.512 4.118 16.000 0.070 0.235 0.008 0.008 2.11 2.609 4.055 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for all the relevant variables for the period between 2007-2014. Starting with the inputs/output of the DEA (all in millions 
euros), Total Income is calculated as the sum of the total interest income and total non-interest income. CapitalR is calculated as the ratio of total equity over total assets 
(measure of bank capitalization). LiquidityR is the ratio of total loans over total total assets (measure of bank liquidity risk). ProfitR is ratio of net income over total assets 
(measure of profitability). CreditR is the ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets (measure of credit risk and asset quality proxy). Size is the logarithm of total assets 
(measure of bank size). GDPg and INF are the annual GDP growth rate and current period inflation (CPI index price) respectively. 
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Table 2: Malmquist Index Decomposition per country, years and periods. 
Countries Years EFFCH TECHCH PECH SECH TFPCH 
Greece 2007 1.016 1.019 1.011 1.005 1.035 
2008 1.023 1.022 1.015 1.008 1.046 
2009 1.021 1.014 1.012 1.009 1.035 
2010 0.999 1.012 0.998 1.001 1.011 
2011 0.961 0.991 0.997 0.964 0.952 
2012 0.988 1.001 0.991 0.997 0.989 
2013 1.016 1.015 1.014 1.002 1.031 
2014 1.022 1.047 1.021 1.001 1.070 
2007-2009 1.020 1.018 1.013 1.007 1.039 
2010-2012 0.983 1.001 0.995 0.987 0.984 
2013-2014 1.019 1.031 1.017 1.001 1.050 
2007-2014 1.006 1.015 1.007 0.998 1.021 
Ireland 2007 1.013 1.021 1.003 1.010 1.034 
2008 1.025 1.021 1.008 1.017 1.046 
2009 1.009 1.019 1.008 1.001 1.028 
2010 1.005 1.012 1.001 1.004 1.017 
2011 0.944 0.989 0.990 0.954 0.934 
2012 0.976 0.997 0.967 1.009 0.973 
2013 1.015 1.008 1.012 1.003 1.023 
2014 1.032 1.015 1.024 1.008 1.047 
2007-2009 1.016 1.020 1.006 1.009 1.036 
2010-2012 0.975 0.999 0.986 0.989 0.974 
2013-2014 1.023 1.011 1.018 1.005 1.035 
2007-2014 1.002 1.010 1.001 1.001 1.012 
Italy 2007 1.018 1.025 1.008 1.010 1.043 
2008 1.029 1.032 1.012 1.017 1.062 
2009 1.035 1.018 1.031 1.004 1.054 
2010 0.973 1.011 0.968 1.005 0.984 
2011 0.959 1.005 0.982 0.977 0.964 
2012 0.973 0.994 0.987 0.986 0.967 
2013 1.005 1.012 1.013 0.992 1.017 
2014 1.047 1.016 1.045 1.002 1.064 
2007-2009 1.027 1.025 1.017 1.010 1.053 
2010-2012 0.968 1.003 0.979 0.989 0.972 
2013-2014 1.026 1.014 1.029 0.997 1.040 
2007-2014 1.004 1.014 1.005 0.999 1.019 
Portugal 2007 1.024 1.022 1.015 1.009 1.047 
2008 1.028 1.019 1.019 1.009 1.048 
2009 1.018 1.022 1.012 1.006 1.040 
2010 0.980 1.010 0.998 0.982 0.990 
2011 0.997 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.995 
2012 0.999 1.002 0.991 1.008 1.001 
2013 1.014 1.013 1.014 1.000 1.027 
2014 1.019 1.034 1.021 0.998 1.054 
2007-2009 1.023 1.021 1.015 1.008 1.045 
2010-2012 0.992 1.003 0.995 0.997 0.995 
2013-2014 1.016 1.023 1.017 0.999 1.040 
2007-2014 1.010 1.015 1.008 1.001 1.025 
Spain 2007 1.020 1.034 1.008 1.012 1.055 
2008 1.032 1.028 1.012 1.020 1.061 
2009 1.024 1.015 1.031 0.993 1.039 
2010 0.995 1.003 0.968 1.028 0.998 
2011 0.961 0.977 0.982 0.979 0.939 
2012 0.984 0.998 0.987 0.997 0.982 
2013 1.025 1.016 1.013 1.012 1.042 
2014 1.055 1.015 1.045 1.010 1.071 
2007-2009 1.025 1.026 1.017 1.008 1.052 
2010-2012 0.980 0.993 0.979 1.001 0.973 
2013-2014 1.040 1.015 1.029 1.011 1.056 
2007-2014 1.012 1.011 1.005 1.006 1.022 
Notes: The table provides the MPI decomposition (TFPCH=EFFCH*TECHCH and 
EFFCH=PECH*SECH) for the yearly observations. For each year during 2007-2014, the values reported 
are annual geometric means obtained from the individual banks of each country. The grey highlighted rows 
present the geometric means of these annual entries for the whole period (2007-2014), the pre- and post-
crisis (2007-2009 / 2013-2014) period, along with the EU crisis period (2010-2012). Values lower than one 
indicate decline in efficiency, while values higher than one refer to efficiency growth. 
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Table 3: Double Bootstrapped Truncated Regression results (baseline models) 
Variables Model 1 
EFFCH 
Model 2 
TECHCH 
Model 3 
PECH 
Model 4 
SECH 
Model 5 
TFPCH 
CapitalR 0.582*** 
(7.87) 
0.460*** 
(2.44) 
0.343*** 
(6.58) 
0.223*** 
(4.82) 
0.574*** 
(7.77) 
LiquidityR -0.180** 
(-2.14) 
-0.141*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.136*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.122*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.191** 
(-2.01) 
ProfitR 0.206*** 
(7.81) 
0.139*** 
(6.39) 
0.123*** 
(5.38) 
0.130*** 
(5.93) 
0.216*** 
(8.29) 
CreditR -0.369*** 
(-8.21) 
-0.348*** 
(-7.19) 
-0.148*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.019** 
(-2.12) 
-0.580*** 
(-4.16) 
Size 0.199*** 
(4.53) 
0.154*** 
(5.46) 
0.048*  
(3.25) 
0.046** 
(2.26) 
0.295*** 
(7.53) 
GDPg  0.004*** 
(4.17) 
0.002** 
(2.34) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
0.004 
(1.06) 
0.009** 
(2.54) 
INF  -0.002*** 
(-0.58) 
-0.003** 
(-2.22) 
-0.001 
(0.82) 
-0.003** 
(-2.29) 
-0.004** 
(-2.43) 
Constant 1.423*** 
(15.23) 
1.414*** 
(5.44) 
1.345*** 
(4.05) 
1.322*** 
(7.00) 
2.327*** 
(3.81) 
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 
 𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅 𝝌𝟐  31.63*** 37.60*** 34.51*** 41.42*** 29.76*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bias-corrected efficiency scores derived from the DEA-MPI method. Z-
statistics are presented in parentheses. Time dummies and country dummies are included in the model. * 
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. See notes on Table 1 for the definition of the 
variables. 
 
 
Table 4: Double Bootstrapped Truncated Regression results (direct crisis effect) 
Variables Model 1 
EFFCH 
Model 2 
TECHCH 
Model 2 
PECH 
Model 3 
SECH 
Model 5 
TFPCH 
CapitalR 0.580*** 
(7.85) 
0.461*** 
(2.43) 
0.343*** 
(6.59) 
0.222*** 
(4.80) 
0.575*** 
(7.75) 
LiquidityR -0.180** 
(-2.10) 
-0.142*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.136*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.121*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.193** 
(-2.20) 
ProfitR 0.200*** 
(7.78) 
0.138*** 
(6.39) 
0.123*** 
(5.37) 
0.129*** 
(5.90) 
0.214*** 
(8.28) 
CreditR -0.368*** 
(-8.15) 
-0.348*** 
(-7.18) 
-0.148*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.018** 
(-2.13) 
-0.578*** 
(-4.12) 
Size 0.197*** 
(4.53) 
0.154*** 
(5.44) 
0.047*  
(3.20) 
0.045** 
(2.26) 
0.294*** 
(7.51) 
Crisis -0.029*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.016*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.420*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.024* 
(-1.88) 
-0.569*** 
(-4.88) 
GDPg 0.004*** 
(4.16) 
0.002** 
(2.33) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
0.009** 
(2.56) 
INF  -0.002*** 
(-0.58) 
-0.002** 
(-2.21) 
-0.001 
(0.82) 
-0.004** 
(-2.30) 
-0.004** 
(-2.44) 
Constant 1.657*** 
(2.35) 
1.414*** 
(5.44) 
2.537*** 
(2.95) 
1.322*** 
(7.00) 
2.327*** 
(3.81) 
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 
 𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅 𝝌𝟐  31.20*** 37.60*** 38.29*** 41.82*** 29.70**** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bias-corrected derived from the DEA-MPI method. Crisis is a dummy 
equal to one for the period between 2010-2012, and zero otherwise. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Time dummies and country dummies are included in the model. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
and *** significant at 1%. See notes on Table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
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Table 5: Double Bootstrapped Truncated Regression results (indirect crisis effect) 
Variables Model 1 
EFFCH 
Model 2 
TECHCH 
Model 3 
PECH 
Model 4 
SECH 
Model 5 
TFPCH 
CapitalR*Crisis 0.220*** 
(4.77) 
0.203*** 
(4.20) 
0.028 
(0.05) 
0.076** 
(2.40) 
0.184*** 
(3.94) 
CapitalR*(1-Crisis) 0.347*** 
(6.10) 
0.527*** 
(5.34) 
-0.036 
(-0.37) 
0.256*** 
(2.97) 
0.689*** 
(3.37) 
LiquidityR*Crisis -0.452*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.818*** 
(-4.53) 
0.004 
(0.40) 
-0.005** 
(-2.11) 
-0.690*** 
(-7.11) 
LiquidityR*(1-Crisis) -0.331** 
(-2.36) 
-0.191 
(-1.44) 
-0.003** 
(-2.02) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
-0.268*** 
(-6.71) 
ProfitR*Crisis 0.216*** 
(4.92) 
0.007*** 
(3.30) 
0.006 
(1.05) 
0.075 
(0.82) 
0.183*** 
(3.94) 
ProfitR*(1-Crisis) 0.537*** 
(3.44) 
0.016*** 
(5.78) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
-0.018 
(-0.46) 
0.691*** 
(3.36) 
CreditR*Crisis -0.379** 
(-2.34) 
-0.633*** 
(-5.20) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.43) 
-1.929*** 
(-7.62) 
CreditR*(1-Crisis) 2.503 
(1.60) 
-0.297*** 
(-7.63) 
-0.013 
(-1.06) 
-0.000 
(-0.13) 
-1.329*** 
(-11.8) 
Size 0.361*** 
(8.93) 
0.148*** 
(2.93) 
0.064** 
(2.32) 
0.020** 
(2.08) 
0.203*** 
(4.57) 
GDPg  0.017** 
(2.72) 
0.080 
(1.10) 
0.014 
(0.458) 
0.061 
(1.11) 
0.066* 
(2.30) 
INF  
 
-0.094** 
(-2.97) 
-0.011** 
(-3.26) 
-0.012 
(-1.02) 
-0.027 
(-0.71) 
-0.099** 
(-2.31) 
Constant 1.412*** 
(15.41) 
1.519*** 
(5.52) 
2.540*** 
(2.65) 
1.298*** 
(6.88) 
-2.316** 
(-3.84) 
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 
 𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅 𝝌𝟐  35.04*** 37.78*** 41.23*** 41.03 28.34*** 
Test of equality 
CapitalR 0.091 0.003 0.884 0.046 0.015 
LiquidityR 0.036 0.009 0.823 0.000 0.046 
ProfitR 0.047 0.000 0.716 0.000 0.016 
CreditR 0.087 0.008 0.006 0.387 0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bias-corrected derived from the DEA-MPI method. Crisis is a dummy equal to one 
for the period between 2010-2012, and zero otherwise. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Time dummies and 
country dummies are included in the model. Tests of equality between coefficients using the chi-square (1) statistic are 
shown at the foot of the table.  * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. See notes on Table 
1 for the definition of the variables.  
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Table 6: Double Bootstrapped Truncated Regression results (financial development) 
Variables 
Model 1 
EFFCH 
Model 2 
TECHCH 
Model 3 
PECH 
Model 4 
SECH 
Model 5 
TFPCH 
CapitalR*Crisis*FD 0.619** 
(2.12) 
0.763*** 
(2.73) 
-0.555 
(-1.44) 
0.007 
(0.682) 
0.704*** 
(5.06) 
CapitalR*(1-Crisis)*FD 0.656** 
(2.02) 
0.993*** 
(2.90) 
-0.135 
(-0.35) 
0.207 
(2.15) 
0.305** 
(4.01) 
CapitalR*Crisis*(1-FD) 0.207*** 
(3.63) 
0.692*** 
(3.76) 
-0.908 
(-1.95) 
-0.013 
(-1.16) 
0.172*** 
(4.50) 
CapitalR*(1-Crisis)*(1-FD) 0.360*** 
(5.21) 
0.704*** 
(4.00) 
0.022 
(0.560) 
0.088 
(0.547) 
0.215*** 
(3.32) 
LiquidityR*Crisis*FD -0.306*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.183 
(-1.54) 
0.785 
(1.63) 
0.403 
(0.83) 
-0.414*** 
(-3.52) 
LiquidityR*(1-Crisis)*FD -0.244*** 
(-3.98) 
0.177 
(0.72) 
0.253 
(1.38) 
0.178 
(1.03) 
-0.056 
(-0.20) 
LiquidityR*Crisis*(1-FD) -0.707*** 
(-5.41) 
-0.290** 
(-2.47) 
-0.071 
(-0.24) 
0.167 
(1.00) 
-1.722** 
(-2.94) 
LiquidityR*(1-Crisis)*(1-FD) -0.455*** 
(-5.52) 
0.093 
(0.658) 
0.276 
(0.37) 
0.176 
(1.03) 
-1.347 
(-0.73) 
ProfitsR*Crisis*FD 0.161*** 
(2.76) 
0.533*** 
(5.51) 
0.167*** 
(2.93) 
0.867 
(2.07) 
0.316*** 
(3.79) 
ProfitsR*(1-Crisis)*FD 0.023 
(0.15) 
0.118 
(1.36) 
0.182 
(0.99) 
0.014 
(0.52) 
0.230*** 
(3.99) 
ProfitsR*Crisis*(1-FD) 0.089*** 
(2.67) 
0.278*** 
(3.46) 
0.092*** 
(2.80) 
4.099** 
(2.22) 
0.216*** 
(4.92) 
ProfitsR*(1-Crisis)*(1-FD) 0.235** 
(3.38) 
0.999*** 
(3.96) 
0.282** 
(3.12) 
4.140 
(1.33) 
0.536*** 
(3.44) 
CreditR*Crisis*FD -0.516** 
(-2.36) 
0.022 
(0.82) 
-0.280 
(-0.18) 
-0.356 
(-1.00) 
-0.221 
(-1.48) 
CreditR*(1-Crisis)*FD -0.141 
(-0.92) 
0.017 
(0.26) 
0.031 
(0.59) 
0.005 
(0.965) 
-0.125 
(-1.60) 
CreditR*Crisis*(1-FD) -1.132*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.226*** 
(-6.15) 
-3.356 
(-1.97) 
-0.465 
(-1.27) 
-0.565*** 
(-4.18) 
CreditR*(1-Crisis)*(1-FD) -0.421** 
(-2.11) 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
-2.039 
(-1.79) 
-0.091 
(-0.82) 
-0.112* 
(-1.86) 
Size 0.001*** 
(5.37) 
0.002 
(1.34) 
0.007 
(0.17) 
-0.054 
(-1.23) 
0.003** 
(2.57) 
GDPg 0.002* 
(1.95) 
0.004** 
(2.06) 
0.061 
(1.04) 
0.014 
(0.52) 
0.005* 
(2.43) 
INF -0.003** 
(4.34) 
0.002 
(0.70) 
-0.056 
(-0.85) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.099* 
(-1.88) 
Constant 0.454*** 
(14.8) 
0.403*** 
(4.79) 
2.845** 
(17.06) 
0.520*** 
(13.43) 
0.094** 
(6.08) 
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 
𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅 𝝌𝟐 39.84 36.78 38.5 36.7 40.1 
Test of equality 
CapitalR*Crisis 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.512 0.001 
CapitalR*(1-Crisis) 0.005 0.000 0.865 0.236 0.005 
CapitalR*FD 0.085 0.000 0.025 0.004 0.011 
CapitalR*(1-FD) 0.000 0.000 0.546 0.491 0.002 
LiquidityR*Crisis 0.006 0.075 0.058 0.365 0.062 
LiquidityR*(1-Crisis) 0.054 0.356 0.765 0.367 0.234 
LiquidityR*FD 0.003 0.080 0.303 0.678 0.602 
LiquidityR*(1-FD) 0.031 0.095 0.645 0.689 0.017 
ProfitR*Crisis 0.077 0.006 0.099 0.214 0.045 
ProfitR*(1-Crisis) 0.080 0.002 0.511 0.398 0.395 
ProfitR*FD 0.001 0.080 0.837 0.685 0.211 
ProfitR*(1-FD) 0.007 0.066 0.082 0.066 0.046 
CreditR*Crisis 0.076 0.095 0.052 0.065 0.080 
CreditR*(1-Crisis) 0.089 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.056 
CreditR*FD 0.51 0.153 0.237 0.045 0.524 
CreditR*(1-FD) 0.051 0.000 0.518 0.085 0.007 
Notes: FD is a proxy for capital market development. FD is measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country’s stock 
market capitalisation is greater than the mean, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the bias-corrected technical 
efficiency derived from the DEA method. Crisis is a dummy equal to one for the period between 2010-2012, and zero 
otherwise. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Time dummies and country dummies are included in the model. Tests 
of equality between coefficients using the chi-square (1) statistic are shown at the foot of the table. * Significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. See notes on Table 1 for the definition of the variables.  
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Table A.1: Double Bootstrapped Truncated Regression results (baseline models/trend components) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bias-corrected efficiency scores derived from the DEA-MPI method. Z-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Time trend with parameter estimates and country dummies are included in the model. * 
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. See notes on Table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
 
Table A.2: Double Bootstrapped Truncated Regression results (direct crisis effect/trend components) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bias-corrected efficiency scores derived from the DEA-MPI method. Crisis is a 
dummy equal to one for the period between 2010-2012, and zero otherwise. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Time trend with parameter estimates and country dummies are included in the model. * Significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. See notes on Table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
 
 
Variables Model 1 
EFFCH 
Model 2 
TECHCH 
Model 3 
PECH 
Model 4 
SECH 
Model 5 
TFPCH 
CapitalR 0.576*** 
(7.81) 
0.387*** 
(2.58) 
0.348*** 
(6.10) 
0.216** 
(4.92) 
0.494*** 
(7.20) 
LiquidityR -0.178** 
(-2.13) 
-0.139*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.130*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.120*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.187** 
(-2.92) 
ProfitR 0.292*** 
(8.88) 
0.256*** 
(9.26) 
0.113*** 
(7.42) 
0.200*** 
(6.04) 
0.284*** 
(6.94) 
CreditR -0.630*** 
(-8.23) 
-0.448*** 
(-7.73) 
-0.138*** 
(-6.73) 
-0.121*** 
(-5.95) 
-0.675*** 
(-8.87) 
Size 0.196*** 
(5.26) 
0.074*** 
(5.07) 
0.021***  
(4.10) 
0.018*** 
(3.24) 
0.284*** 
(6.94) 
GDPg 0.005*** 
(2.65) 
0.002** 
(2.76) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.003 
(1.57) 
0.011** 
(2.24) 
INF -0.003 
(-0.78) 
-0.004** 
(-2.64) 
-0.007 
(-1.53) 
-0.004** 
(-2.37) 
-0.009** 
(-2.87) 
Constant 1.820*** 
(14.72) 
1.825*** 
(8.98) 
1.558*** 
(3.56) 
1.564*** 
(7.24) 
2.459*** 
(7.10) 
Year -0.202*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.115** 
(-2.02) 
-0.013* 
(-1.97) 
-0.027*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.075** 
(-2.07) 
Year*Year 0.009*** 
(3.70) 
0.006*** 
(3.41) 
0.001** 
(3.29) 
0.003* 
(1.65) 
0.005*** 
(2.71) 
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 
𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅 𝝌𝟐 32.71*** 38.12*** 35.61*** 42.02*** 31.00*** 
Variables Model 1 
EFFCH 
Model 2 
TECHCH 
Model 3 
PECH 
Model 4 
SECH 
Model 5 
TFPCH 
CapitalR 0.574*** 
(7.80) 
0.386*** 
(2.58) 
0.348*** 
(6.11) 
0.215** 
(4.90) 
0.493*** 
(7.18) 
LiquidityR -0.177** 
(-2.13) 
-0.139*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.129*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.120*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.186** 
(-2.93) 
ProfitR 0.292*** 
(8.87) 
0.256*** 
(9.25) 
0.112*** 
(7.41) 
0.200*** 
(6.05) 
0.283*** 
(6.93) 
CreditR -0.629*** 
(-8.23) 
-0.448*** 
(-7.72) 
-0.138*** 
(-6.72) 
-0.120*** 
(-5.95) 
-0.675*** 
(-8.86) 
Size 0.196*** 
(5.26) 
0.098*** 
(5.07) 
0.021***  
(4.12) 
0.018*** 
(3.25) 
0.283*** 
(6.94) 
Crisis -0.050*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.077*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.425** 
(-2.83) 
-0.048* 
(-3.32) 
-0.572** 
(-0.199) 
GDPg 0.005*** 
(2.64) 
0.002** 
(2.36) 
0.004 
(0.34) 
0.002 
(1.55) 
0.011** 
(2.05) 
INF -0.003 
(-0.77) 
-0.004** 
(-2.63) 
-0.006 
(-1.53) 
-0.004** 
(-2.39) 
-0.009** 
(-2.86) 
Constant 1.767*** 
(8.66) 
1.825*** 
(8.98) 
1.588*** 
(3.24) 
1.560*** 
(7.20) 
2.459*** 
(7.11) 
Year -0.119*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.107*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.072* 
(-1.80) 
-0.083* 
(-2.33) 
-0.089** 
(-2.52) 
Year*Year 0.004*** 
(4.61) 
0.005*** 
(4.18) 
0.003* 
(2.21) 
0.004*** 
(0.305) 
0.004* 
(3.43) 
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 
𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅 𝝌𝟐 32.10*** 37.80*** 39.42*** 42.33*** 30.09*** 
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Figures 
Figure 1: The evolution of financial development in the EU periphery economies compared to the US one
 
Note: The table presents the stock market capitalization/GDP ratio (FD) over the sample period for all 
countries under study against the higher financially developed market, the US. A higher FD ratio indicates 
that there is a larger market size, thus investors have confidence in the market’s ability to channel funds into 
the most efficient projects. 
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Figure 2: Peripheral banking efficiency evolution during 2007-2014 
 
Note: The figure presents the TFPCH, EFFCH and TECHCH evolution of each country for all years.  
